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INDIANA
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ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS AND PERSONAL
RIGHTS IN THE PRESENT SUPREME COURT
RALPH F. FUCHS*
Among the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
during the final month of 1948 is one which, viewed with
reference to the distribution of powers in the Federal Govern-
ment, is indicative of the continued authority of the courts
under our system of widespread judicial concern with mat-
ters of administration. In Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell'
a group of employees of contractors who performed work
at the Bermuda naval base, leased by the United States
from the British government, succeeded in overcoming ex-
ecutive contentions as to the interpretation of the lease agree-
ment in an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. By
a 5-4 vote of the Justices, the Act was held to apply to the
naval base as against a previous adverse interpretation of
the Wage-Hour Administrator 2 and strong representations
to the Court by the Department of State and the Depart-
* Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. 69 Sup. Ct. 140 (1948).
2. The Administrator's rulings are cited in notes 21 and 22 of Mr.
Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Vin-
son and Justices Frankfurter and Burton concurred. Id. at 155.
The explicit rulings were not published, but took the form of
letters written to inquirers by the Administrator in 1942. They
were reflected in a subsequently published list of territories and
possessions deemed covered by the Act, 29 CODE FED. REGs. § 776
(Supp. 1947) and are printed in an appendix to the brief of the
United States as Amicus Curiae in the case, at 55-57. The Ad-
ministrator later deferred a renewed interpretation on the point
in deference to anticipated determinations by the courts and other
agencies. Id. at 17. Published interpretations by the Adminis-
trator, although lacking statutory force, are ordinarily accorded
considerable weight by the courts. Cf. Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U. S. 134 at 137-140 (1944).
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ment of Justice.3 The Government argued vigorously that
affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals, which
was favorable to the employees' contention, would be un-
fortunate in its effects upon our foreign relations. The dis-
senting opinion regards these effects as attaching to the
result in the Supreme Court.
On the merits the decision seems sensible and sound.4
The question was whether the Bermuda base was embraced
by the language of the Act defining the statute's coverage as
extending to commerce to or from "any State of the United
States or the District of Columbia or any Territory or pos-
session of the United States."5  Concededly the word "pos-
session" was the only one that might include the Bermuda
base and others similarly leased from the British and other
foreign governments. The lower court's holding that the
language included the base was predicated upon the view
that "the areas are subject to fully as complete control by
the Uniied States as obtains in other areas long known as
'possessions' of the United States," such as the territories,
the smaller island possessions, and the Panama Canal Zone.,
This reasoning was not followed by the Supreme Court which
held, rather, that the word in the Fair Labor Standards Act
had reference to areas subject to the economic regulatory
power of Congress, without regard to other attributes of
sovereignty. The Court made it clear that the base "is not
territory of the United States in a-political sense, that is, a
part of its national domain." 7  No direct evidence of Con-
3. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 69 Sup. Ct. 140, 153, 155 (1948)
(dissenting opinion).
4. The action of the Court of Appeals, here affirmed, reversed
a dismissal of the employees' action by the district court and
remanded the proceedings. Hence it does not conclude the case.
It remains necessary for the plaintiffs to establish, in addi-
tion to the details of their claims, that their employment was
in commerce, or, conceivably, 'in the production of goods for
commerce, within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. The Supreme Court opinion, by Mr. Justice Reed, refers
to the employees as "allegedly in commerce"; the dissenting
opinion concludes that "there is not and under the lease there
can not be in the leased area any 'commerce' subject to the
Act." The lower court, in the light of an affidavit of one of
the eleven, plaintiffs, could "not say they were not engaged in
commerce." Connell v. Vermilya-Brown Co., 164 F.2d 924, 929
(C. C. A. 2d 1947).
5. § 3(c), 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 203(c) (1940).
6. 164 F.2d at 927.
7. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 69 Sup. Ct. 140, 142 (1948).
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gressional intent was or could have been found, since the
Fair Labor Standards Act was adopted before the Bermuda
base or others similarly obtained were acquired,8 and no
subsequent statutory provision to cover the point had been
made or proposed. Nor was the matter mentioned in the
arrangements with Great Britain, covering the base. In
these circumstances the Court proceeded "to construe the
word 'possession' as our judgment instructs us the law-
makers, within constitutional limits, would have done had
they acted at the time of the legislation with the present
situation in mind," 9 and it concluded that "there is no reason
for saying" that the Act was not intended to bring "its mini-
mum changes into the labor market of the bases."'' 0 The
Court felt reinforced in its conclusion by a belief that "the
house of assembly of Bermuda would not also undertake
legislation similar to our Fair Labor Standards Act to con-
trol labor relations on the base.""
The concern of the executive branch over the case and
that of the dissenting Justices over the decision stemmed
from the possibility that apprehensions on the part of the
British government and "in more critical quarters abroad" 2
might be aroused. Unilateral definition by American courts
of the rights conferred upon this Government by arrange-
ments to which other governments are party involve, accord-
ing to Mr. Justice Jackson, "a philosophy of annexation
and . . .a psychological accretion to our possessions ..
8. The arrangements were concluded in 1940, by negotiations and
agreements to which both opinions in the case refer. The brief
of the United States, supra, note 2, argues, at 43-44, that ex-
tension of the Act's coverage to leased bases would go unjusti-
fiably beyond the legislative purpose to improve domestic condi-
tions of employment and increase purchasing power in the
economy of the country. The Court pointed out, however, that
"citizens of this country would be numerous among employees
on the bases." Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 69 Sup. Ct. 140,
147 (1948).
9. Id. at 146.
10. Ibid.
11. Id. at 147.
12. Id. at 157.
13. Ibid. The controversy within the Court over the present case
was doubtless affected by the parallel issue of the Court's power
to review the judgments of the Military Tribunal set up by
General MacArthur as the agent of the Allied powers, which
sentenced Japanese leaders for war crimes. The Court has
now concluded with apparent wisdom that it lacks the power
in question. See Koki Hirota v. MacArthur, 69 Sup. Ct. 157,
197 (1948).
1949]
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It must be conceded that the British may well resign them-
selves to the likelihood that other legislation by Congress,
made applicable to outlying areas administered by this Gov-
ernment in terms capable of including the leased bases, may
be held to extend to American operations and even to other
businesses, if any, at the bases.13' The evident answer to
such fears is twofold. First, if a foreign government has
surrendered rights to the United States, there is no good
reason for it to object to the American courts' recognition
of the surrender. 14  Second, if a court decision extending a
statute of the United States to a leasehold should be deemed
erroneous by the contracting governments or harmful in ef-
fect, there is nothing to prevent a further agreement to
clarify the situation; or the administration might propose
legislation to set matters aright in case it wished to take
unilateral action.' 5
I
But it is neither the merits of the Supreme Court's de-
cision on the question of statutory interpretation nor in the
main the desirable locus of power to construe the interna-
tional commitments of this Government that concerns us
13a. The Federal Tort Claims Act has been held applicable to negli-
gence of a United States Government officer at a leased base,
partly in reliance upon the principal case. Spelar v. United
States, 171 F.2d 208 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
14. Mr. Justice Jackson's suggestion that the Court here overreaches
a commitment to which the executive branch has agreed, Ver-
milya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 69 Sup. Ct. 140 at 157 (1948), seems
inconsistent with his apparent earlier concession, id. at 150-151,
that the extension of wage-hour legislation to the bases might
be "deliberately and consciously done by the Congress, . . . per-
haps after consultation with the United Kingdom or Colonial
authorities." The dissenting Justices' answer as to this asserted
inconsistency might be that the real evil of the decision lies
in extending the offensive word "possessions" to the bases. If
so, the majority opinion's point that the word has different
meanings in different contexts and that the decision goes as far
as it goes and no farther, seems sound. Id. at 145.
15. Here, of course, one must reckon with the inertia of legislatures
and the difficulty of securing changes in legal situations to
which vested interests have attached. Mr. Justice Jackson has
given realistic expression to this factor in another context. See
his concurring opinion in Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390,
400-401 (1941). Where, however, someone must lose as the
result of a decision, it is difficult to see why it should be the
party that establishes a legal right, merely because someone
else may find himself in difficulties as a consequence. Were
the decision to go the other way, the shoe would simply be on the
other foot.
[Vol. 24
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here. Attention in this discussion is to be directed, rather,,
to the situation in the Government of the United States
which places it within the competence of a system of courts,
headed by the Supreme Court, to continue to render decisions
from time to time which override the conclusions or
desires of the executive branch in matters falling primarily
within the province of that branch. The problem is the
old one of judicial regard for administrative determinations.
That problem has assumed new aspects of late, as will ap-
pear; but the central issue continues to be the fascinating
one of the proper distribution, or separation, of the powers
of government, viewed not primarily as an issue of binding
constitutional law but as one of jurisprudence and sound
statesmanship.
Judge Clark, writing the opinion of the Court of Ap-
peals in the Vermilya-Brown Co. case, was very clear with
regard to the duty and authority of the court in the situa-
tion presented: "We must determine this private contro-
versy, even as to areas affected by an agreement between na-
tions." 16 The court's relationship to the problem would have
been essentially the same if the controversy had arisen in a
proceeding that was one-half public, between the Govern-
ment on the one hand and a private litigant o the other.
There, to be sure, the administrative determination17 might
have had the benefit of recognized or prescribed rules to
limit the scope of judicial review. 8 The decision of judges
would nevertheless have been invoked in such a proceeding;
and in the end "judicial self-lIfmitation"'1 would have deter-
mined the actual boundaries to the judges' readiness to set
their own conclusions above those of the administrative au-
thorities. Such is the consequence of a system that permits
invocation of judicial proceedings to vindicate private rights
even when these are tinged with a strong element of public
interest.
16. Connell v. Vermilya-Brown Co., 164 F.2d 924 at 927 (1947)(italics supplied).
17. The discussion at this point does not attempt to distinguish
between determinations of law, such as the crucial determina-
tion in the Vermilya-Brown Co. case, and other determinations.
For the effect of such distinctions see infra, pp. 188, 190.
18. Such as those now given general applicability by § 10 of the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 243, 5 U. S. C.§ 1009 (1946).
19. See FINAL REP. ATT'Y. GEN. Co1miIuI. AD. PROC. 75 (1941).
1949]
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The resulting distribution of power is especially char-
acteristic of American government. It does not prevail to
the same extent even under the English system which, like
the. American, avoids a scheme of general administrative
courts to review the actions of officials. There, for example,
some public regulation of wages20 and other important classes
of administrative decisions21 are screened from becoming a
subject of judicial scrutiny. The objections of workers or
others adversely affected by such administrative determina-
tions, whether resulting from foreign-affairs considerations
or from others, must then be directed through political chan-
nels when administrative recourse has been exhausted.22
With us, the courts more usually afford the recognized means
of relief, whether by virtue of statutory provision or by
reason of traditional remedies, such as injunction or habeas
corpus, that have not been foreclosed.23  In fulfilling their
functions in such proceedings the courts must of necessity
encounter the likelihood of clashes with administrative points
of view and strive as best they can to draw a proper boundary
20. See Kahn-Freund, Legislation Through Adjudication. The Legal
Aspects of Fair Wages Clauses, 11 MoD. L. REv. 269, 429 (1948).
21. See ROBSON,' JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2d ed., 1947),
107 (transport licensing), 171 (unemployment insurance), 178
(general national insurance).
22. The opinion in Local Government Board v. Arlidge, [1915] A. C.
120, which severely restricted the scope of the judicial review
possible in a proceeding to challenge an order to close a tene-
ment, and which had wider implications, justified the decision
in part upon the ground that the aggrieved owner might seek
recourse to questioning of the responsible cabinet minister by
the owner's member of the House of Commons. For recognition
of a counter-tendency to extend judicial review as to some
matters of administration in England see Fuchs, Concepts and
Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law Theory, 47 YALE
L. J. 538, 562 (1938).
23. There are exceptions, of course, since in this country also judi-
cial review of some classes of administrative actions is pre-
cluded by explicit statutory provision or by judicially-determined
limitation. National Mediation Board cases, infra, at p. 175;
Barnett v. Hines, 105 F.2d 96 (App. D. C. 1939), cert. denied,
308 U. S. 573. See Davis, Nonreviewable Administrative Action,
96 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 749 (1948). The tendency is strong in re-
cent legislation, on the other hand, to make specific provision
for judicial review of even such administrative acts as general
regulations. See FINAL REP., op. cit. supra, note 19, at 116-117.
The Supreme Court in 1942, over the dissent of Justices Frank-
furter, Reed, and Douglas, grounded the power to review the
validity of the Federal Communications Commission's chain
broadcasting regulations upon a doubtful statutory base. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U. S. 407 (1942).
The regulations were later sustained. National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 (1943).
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between matters that are determined elsewhere with binding
effect upon the courts and those that are open to judicial
examination.
It is a commonplace that the present Supreme Court is
on the whole far more deferential to administrative deter-
minations than the "old Court." The reasons usually given
by the Court come down, in the main, to legislative reliance
upon the special competence of administrative agencies es-
tablished by statute to deal with specified matters, coupled
with judicial duty to recognize the authority of the agen-
cies to make the determinations entrusted to them.24 The
Vermilya-Brown Co. case did not, of course, present precisely
such a situation, since Congress did not specifically entrust
to any particular agency the determination of the Fair
Labor Standards Act's geographical coverage. Yet the prob-
lem presented might easily have been settled on the basis
of deference to executive determination, both in the utter-
ances of the Administrator and in the expressed conclusions
of the foreign-policy agency of the Government.2a The case
presents, therefore, an instance of occasional strong insist-
ence upon judicial power to scrutinize administrative deter-
minations, with which the present Court has from time to
time accompanied its more usual deference to administrative
action. The inquiry in this article is directed to certain
situations in which this insistence has emerged; to the
reasons for the results reached; and to the question whether
these results reflect a sound distribution of governmental
authority.
24. Federal Communications Comm. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,
309 U. S. 134 (1940) (agency authority with respect to matters
of administrative procedure); National Labor Relations Ed. v.
Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U. S. 206 (1940) (conclusive-
ness of administrative determinations of fact); National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 (1943), and Federal
Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U. S. 218 (1943)
(administrative authority in matters of discretion); Dobson v.
Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489 (1943), and National Labor Rela-
tions Ed. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111 (1944) (finality
attaching to determinations to which administrative expertness
has contributed). The Court has again invoked the philosophy
of deference to agency expertise at the present term, in Ayrshire
Collieries Corp. v. United States, 69 Sup. Ct. 278, 289 (1949).
24a. Cf. Note, Judicial Deference to the State Department on Inter-
national Legal Issues, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 79 (1948).
19491
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II
It is not irrelevant to note that the plaintiffs in the
Vermilya-Brown Co. case were employees asserting their in-
dividual rights and that in the field of foreign relations such
persons are peculiarly likely to have their claims overborne
by considerations of "high policy" to which officials are
prone to give effect.25 The Court has been alert in various
recent instances to which Mr. Justice Frankfurter has just
alluded in a concurring opinion,6 to protect the legitimate
interests of such parties, so far as feasible judicially, against
power that in one way or another might strike them down.
25. See Mathews, Labor Standards Provisions in Foreign Procure-
ment Contracts, 42 ILL. L. REV. 141 (1947), for a reflection of
the difficulties within the United States Government which, dur-
ing wartime, beset a project of administrative origin for reliev-
ing the condition of severely oppressed Bolivian workers em-ployed in production for the United States. A government
Memorandum in support of a petition for rehearing filed in the
instant case contains statements from the affected departments
with regard to the alleged difficulties imposed by the decision
upon defense operations at bases all over the world, upon for-
eign relations, and upon wage-hour administration. According
to the statement of Secretary of the Army Royall, wage-hour
litigation would heighten the difficulty of maintaining "appro-
priate secrecy" as to "classified" construction projects. Memor-
andum, at 13-14. Most serious would be the application of the
Fair Labor Standards Act's wage provision to "native workmen,"
outnumbering American workmen by about 10 to 1, which would
encounter the "militant opposition" of the local foreign govern-
ments. Id. at 14-15. Although the construction projects listed
as affected are located in Canada, Newfoundland, Bermuda, Ice-
land, and Greece, in addition to the South Pacific (id. at 13), the
nature of some of the local economies is perhaps indicated by
the wage scales prevailing in the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, now being governed by the Department of the Navy,
which, in addition to 7%0 an hour for domestic help, range from
9.30 an hour for common labor to 14.30 for skilled labor, with
somewhat higher rates on Saipan. See TRUST TERRITORY OF THE
PACIFIC ISLANDS (July, 1948), containing information conveyed
by the United States to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, at 94. Improvement may of course occur, with or with-
out the Supreme Court, because of the President's "bold new
program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and
industrial progress available for the improvement and growth
of under-developed areas," to the end that, "by helping the
least fortunate of its members," the human family may "achieve
the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people." This
program was announced in the Inaugural Address in January,
after the petition for rehearing in the Vermilya-Brown Co. case
and the Memorandum in its support had been filed. Actually
the number of workers affected by the decision may be quite
small, because of the requirement that commerce or production
of goods for commerce must be involved.
26. American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co.,
69 Sup. Ct. 258, 260, 262 (1949).
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In Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co. v. Burley,'7 which is among
the cases cited by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, it protected in-
dividual interests by upsetting the foundation for a decision
of an administrative agency, the National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board, over the strong dissent of four Justices and
over the protest of the principal labor organizations, filed
with the Court upon a rehearing of the case. The principal
question was whether the Railway Labor Act of 193428 con-
ferred authority upon a labor union to settle with a carrier
certain claims of individual employees for sums alleged to
be due them under the terms of a collective agreement. The
action which gave rise to the decision was brought in court
by the employees upon the claims in question in the face
of an alleged settlement by their union which had resulted
in withdrawal of a proceeding before the National Railroad
Adjustment Board to enforce the same claims. In a later
administrative proceeding upon the claims the Board had also
held the settlement final. The Court, fastening upon
a point which the Board had almost certainly ignored, held
that the settlement was binding upon the employees only if
they had in some manner individually authorized the union
to represent them in the negotiation with the employer.
Similarly, the decision of the Board giving effect to the
settlement was held not to be conclusive upon the employees 9
unless the union was authorized by them to bring the later
proceeding before the Board.3 0 The Court noted that long-
standing administrative practice had recognized the authority
of unions to negotiate with the carriers with regard to the
claims of employees whom they represented in collective
bargaining, as part of their function of carrying on rela-
tions with the employers, and that in practice the privilege
of bringing employee claims before the National Railroad
Adjustment Board had been confined to the railway unions
as distinguished from individual employees.31 The Court
27. 325 U. S. 711 (1945), aff'd upon rehearing, 327 U. S. 661 (1946).
28. 48 STAT. 1185 (1934), 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (1946).
29. Under the provision of § 3 First (m) of the Act, 45 U. S. C. §
153 First (in) (1946), that "awards shall be final and bind-
ing, except insofar as they shall contain a money award."
30. The Court expressly refrained from deciding whether an award
denying a money claim might be a "money award" within the
statutory exception to the rule of administrative finality. Elgin,
Joliet & Eastern R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711 at 720 (1945).
31. Id. at 732-733. The practice of confining the initiation of pro-
19491
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held, nevertheless, that the Railway Labor Act drew a dis-
tinction between the settlement of "grievances" of individual
employees as to past matters and the negotiation of collective
agreements, including agreements as to the subsequent appli-
cation of previous contracts. The formation of agreements
falls within the sphere of collective bargaining, as to which
the unions designated under the statute32 have exclusive au-
thority; the adjustment of grievances is a process-normally,
but not necessarily, making use of union machinery-in
which the individual's claim is primary and subject to his
control.
The Court's decision was influenced by consideration of
the situation of non-members of the railway unions and mem-
bers of minority unions in the employ of the carriers, which
the opinion emphasizes. Upon the rehearing Mr. Justice
Rutledge, speaking for the Court as he had in the initial
decision, discussed mainly the position of the majority union
member, emphasizing the numerous ways in which he may
be deemed to have bound himself to accept the union's dis-
position of a claim belonging to him. These include "appro-
priate provisions in by-laws, constitution, or other govern-
ing regulations, as well as by usage or custom," 33 and
ceedings before the Board to the unions had been maintained
upon the insistence of the employee representatives, composing
one-half of the Board's membership, but had never been agreed
to by the carrier representatives or been authoritatively estab-
lished as correct. Monograph of the Att'y Gen. Comm. on Ad.
Proc., Nat'l R. R. Adj. Bd., SEN. Doc. No. 10, PART 4, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1942). The Attorney General's Committee
noted the situation but refrained from making a recommendation
with regard to it. FINAL REP., op. cit. supra, note 17, at 188.
It is pointed out in a brief filed with the Court by the Govern-
ment as Amicus Curiae upon the reargument of the Burley case,
p. 10, that a recognized railway union was permitted to file pro-
ceedings in behalf of employees whether or not it represented
them as collective bargaining agent in the craft or class to
which they belonged. Hence some minority unions were not
barred from the Board.
32. Section 2 of the Act prescribes the manner of designating the
representatives of each craft or class of employees of a carrier
for this purpose. Sec. 2 Second and Ninth imposes the duty
upon the carrier to treat with the representatives as designated.
48 STAT. 1189 (1934), 45 U. S. C. § 152 Second, Ninth (1946).
See Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 515 (1937).
The representative bargains for all members of the craft or
class, whether or not they are or can become members. Order
of R. R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U. S.
342 (1944) ; Steele v. L. & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 (1944).
33. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co. v. Burley, 327 U. S. 661 at 663
n.2 (1946).
[Vol. 24
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acquiesence in the known handling of his claim by union
representatives.34  As a result Mr. Justice Frankfurter was
led to remark in his reiterated dissent that the Court ad-
hered to its original decision "by extracting from it almost
all of its vitality."35  Only union members were involved
in the case; but the opinion of the Court is careful to reject
the propriety of a union's attempting to "usurp" an em-
ployee's right to control the handling of his own claim on
the basis of the previous "erroneous conception" that the
statute "confers exclusive statutory power upon the collective
agent to deal with the carrier concerning individual griev-
ances and to represent the aggrieved employee in Board pro-
ceedings." 36 This warning has particular force in relation
to nonunion employees. In its original opinion the Court,
noting that the Act forbade closed shop agreements and that
"the interests of unorganized workers and members of mi-
nority unions are concerned in the solution" of the problem
presented,3 7 expressed the view that "It would be difficult
to believe that Congress intended ... to submerge wholly the
individual and minority interests, with all power to act con-
cerning them, in the collective interest and agency, not only
in forming the contracts which govern their employment re-
lation, but also in giving effect to them and to all other in-
cidents of that relation."38
34. Id. at 665-666.
35. Id. at 668.
36. Id. at 664.
37. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711 at 734 n.31(1945).
38. Id. at 733-734. The Government took the position in its brief,
supra note 31, at 27-37, that it should be a sufficient safeguard
to individual employees to recognize (as had been the practice)
their right to negotiate in their own behalf if they desire and
to permit them to bring proceedings before the Adjustment
Board (as the labor members of the Board had refused to per-
mit them to do), without also requiring affirmative authoriza-
tion in order to permit a union to represent and bind them in
the absence of such self-representation. Problems of notice
where a union proceeds without express authorization obviously
arise; but, as the brief points out, these inhere in numerous
situations coming before the Board, in which the identity of
many of the employees affected by a dispute (e.g., as to senior-
ity) may not be known until the stage of actual application of
the award is reached. See Monograph, op. cit. supra, note 31,
at 7-10. Individual employees have the additional option to
bring suit in federal court upon a "grievance" claim, without
resort to processes of adjustment or to the Adjustment Board.
Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630 (1941).
19493
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The Court had previously had occasion to condemn-
this time unanimously-a viciously unfair subversion of mi-
nority interests for which the Railway Labor Act's provis-
ions had been employed. In Steele v. L. & N. R. Co.39 and
Tunstall v. Brotherhood"4 actions were brought in state and
federal courts, respectively, by Negro firemen on certain
railroads to enjoin the enforcement as to them of certain
collective agreements between the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen and certain southern railroads.
These agreements, on a basis of race discrimination, operated
to deprive the plaintiffs of desirable employment. The plain-
tiffs were not even eligible for membership in the carefully
guarded "white" union but, by virtue of the statute, were
nevertheless "represented" by it in collective bargaining with
the carriers. Holding that the union owed a statutory duty
to represent in good faith, without discrimination, all mem-
bers of the craft or class for which it bargained, including
the plaintiffs, and to accord to the plaintiffs a voice in the
consideration of the employees' problems, the Court con-
cluded that the judicial jurisdiction and duty to enforce the
statute existed. In so doing, it considered that the plain-
tiffs had no available administrative remedy-for two
reasons. One was that the union itself, whose conduct was
the basis of complaint, afforded the only channel through
which a proceeding in the National Railroad Adjustment
Board 41 could be brought. The other was that one-half of
the membership of the Board itself was chosen, under the
provisions of the Act, by a group of unions, many of whom
pursued the same exclusionary policy.42
In reaching its decision in the Steele and Tunstall cases
the Court overcame a formidable barrier of immunity of ad-
ministrative determinations under the Railway Labor Act
from judicial interference, erected by its own decisions of
only the year before.43  In Switchmen's Union v. National
39. 323 U. S. 192 (1944).
40. 323 U. S. 210 (1944).
41. The assumption was made that the plaintiff's case fell within
the jurisdiction over "disputes between an employee or group
of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances
or out of the interpretation or application of agreements," con-
ferred by § 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, 48 STAT. 1189
(1934), 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (i) (1946).
42. Steele v. L. & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 at 205-206 (1944).
43. In so doing it was perhaps aided by a brief amicus filed by the
Solicitor General, the successful advocate in the principal previous
cases.
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Mediation Board,44 General Committee v. M.-K.-T. R. Co.,45
and Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks v. United Transport
Service Employees," a variety of determinations of the Na-
tional Mediation Board, companion agency to the National
Railroad Adjustment Board under the Railway Labor Act,
were held immune to judicial review. The view was taken
in these cases that the Act confers exclusive and final au-
thority upon the Board to determine certain disputes or, in
some situations, gives authority to the parties to arrive at
their own solutions with the aid of the Board when they
choose to invoke that aid. The several determinations of
the Board in these cases related to the Board's own authority
to consider the claims of a group of employees upon a por-
tion of the New York Central System to be separated from
those on the System as a whole for the purpose of choosing
a collective bargaining representative; to the authority of
one union as against another to bargain with a carrier in a
situation where the same duties might at various times be
performed by the members of each; and, in the third case,
to the authority of a white union to represent the members
of an open union in collective bargaining. All of these
points related to the authority, or jurisdiction, of collective
bargaining representatives. It would not have been difficult
for the Court to conclude that the controversy in the Steele
and Tunstall cases also related to that authority, rather than
to the manner of its exercise, and hence fell either within
the matters subject to exclusive determination by the Na-
tional Mediation Board or within the "many areas" of rail-
road labor relations "where neither the administrative nor
the judicial function can be utilized" because Congress left
them to be governed exclusively by "those voluntary processes
whose use Congress had long encouraged . .,, ' Instead,
it chose to regard them as justiciable controversies under
the Railway Labor Act, determinable by the courts when
brought there.4 8 The reason the Court did so seems almost
44. 320 U. S. 297 (1943).
45. 320 U. S. 323 (1943).
46. 320 U. S. 715, 816 (1943).
47. General Committee v. M.-K.-T. R. Co., 320 U. S. 323 at 337
(1943).
48. As such they are reviewable by the Supreme Court under § 237(b) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 344(b) (1946), when
determined by the highest court of a state, and are within thejurisdiction conferred upon the federal district courts by § 24(8)
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necessarily to lie in its concern over the interests to be pro-
tected. A similar concern had earlier led it to hold that the
basic duty of a carrier to bargain collectively under the
Act could be enforced judicially despite the silence of Con-
gress upon the point.49 The cases referred to above, involv-
ing determinations of the Mediation Board, on the other
hand, concerned inter-union disputes of a rather technical
nature, affecting rights that seemed to balance each other
and to call less clearly for judicial solicitude.
In the more recent cases involving the Adjustment
Board, it seems fair to say, a shifting majority of the Su-
preme Court fashioned a powerful wedge of judicial sur-
veillance from conceptions of legislative purpose, theories as
to adjudication, and ideas of the proper relation of courts
to administrative agencies as material, driving it deeply into
the area of employment relations where the protection of in-
dividual and minority interests seemed to call for such action.
It did so despite earlier application of the doctrine of finality
to other administrative determinations in the railway labor
field. Among individual Justices who participated in both
the earlier and later cases, the attitudes ranged from adher-
ence to the doctrine of judicial non-intervention in all but
the Steel and Tunstall decisions, which was shared by Chief
Justice Stone and Justice Frankfurter, to Justice Reed's as-
sertion of judicial authority in all of the cases.50
of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 41(8) (1946), relating to
"suits and proceedings under any law regulating commerce."
49. Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 515 (1937).
50. Mr. Justice Reed dissented for himself, Mr. Justice Roberts, and
Mr. Justice Jackson in the Switchmen's Union case. The latter
two, however, joined the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in the Elgin, Joliet & Eastern dissent. Mr. Justice Doug-
las and Mr. Justice Murphy made the opposite transition between
the two cases. Mr. Justice Rutledge, who did not participate
in the Switchmen's Union case, would doubtless have occupied
the same position as Mr. Justice Reed, since he participated in
the case in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, from which it came, when he was still a member
of that bench, and would have set aside the Board's order.
Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 135 F.2d 785,
796 (App. D. C. 1943). Mr. Justice Black likewise did not
participate in that case in the Supreme Court, but joined the
majority in the M.-K.-T. decision, as did Mr. Justice Jackson
and Mr. Justice Rutledge. On the present Court, Justices Reed
and Rutledge have written in behalf of judicial intervention and
have been joined in the Elgin, Joliet & Eastern case by Justices
Black, Douglas, and Murphy, in which Justices Frankfurter
and Jackson were on the other side.
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These attitudes have been compounded of numerous ele-
ments, but the factor that has emerged as most influential
appears to be the appeal of threatened interests, valid in
the eyes of the Justices, 51 for protection at the hands of the
courts. And the type of interest safeguarded in the Railroad
Adjustment Board cases is quite similar to that which has led
the same majority of the Court 52 to set its views against
those of the executive branch in the Vermilya-Brown Co. case
at the present term of Court.
III
The individual chosen for compulsory induction into the
armed forces or for assignment to work of national im-
portance under the Selective Service Act, who found him-
self pitted against the Government's war machine in a dis-
pute over a claimed exemption, was also accorded increased
opportunity to challenge the administrative determination
under the view taken by the majority of the Court in a series
of recent decisions. The series began in the midst of the
war with an apparently sweeping interpretation of the rule
of administrative finality expressed in the statute.5 3 In
Falbo v. United States"4 the petitioner had been convicted of
violating the Act by willfully refusing to report for work
of national importance, to which he had been ordered pur-
suant to classification as a conscientious objector. He claimed
to be a minister of religion within the meaning of the statu-
tory provision 5 5 according complete exemption to persons
classified as such. In the district court he urged that the
merits of his claimed exemption should be tried or that at
least the court should review the local board's action to de-
termine whether it had been rendered "prejudicial, unfair,
and arbitrary" by refusal to admit certain evidence, by
51. It is not intended to suggest that the appraisal of interests in
this connection is purely or even mainly subjective. Rather,
as will appear more fully below, it is an appraisal in which
objective considerations of far wider range play a dominant part.
52. Justices Black, Reed, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge. See note
50, supra.
53. Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 885, . 10 (a)
(2) (1940), 50 U. S. C. App. § 310(a) (2) (1946): "The de-
cisions of ... local boards shall be final except where an appeal
is authorized .... The decision of . . . appeal boards shall be
final ... unless modified or changed by the President. "
54. 320 U. S. 549 (1944).
55. Sec. 5(d), 54 STAT. 887 (1940), 50 U. S. C. App. § 305(d) (1946).
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alleged antipathy of board members to the Jehovah's Witness
sect to which Falbo belonged, and by decision against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence. The court refused
to consider these objections and instructed the jury to con-
vict if they found that Falbo had failed to report as ordered.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
In sustaining the decision below the Court pointed out
that Falbo had not exhausted his administrative recourse
before offering his challenge in court to the denial of his
exemption. The Act provided that induction should not
take place until physical and mental fitness had been deter-
mined-a process which under the regulations then in effect
took place after the individual reported for induction. It
was entirely possible that Falbo would be rejected at that
stage; and Congress clearly did not intend to "allow litigious
interruption of the process of selection." Moreover, "the
complete absence of any provision for challenges in the very
section providing for prosecution of violations in the civil
courts permits no other inference than that Congress did not
intend they could be made."56 Mr. Justice Rutledge, con-
curring, pointed out that the abuse Falbo claimed in the ac-
tion of the local board, even if committed, was cured by the
appeal board proceeding to which he resorted. Further,
he said, "Apart from some challenge upon constitutional
grounds, I have no doubt that Congress could and did exclude
judicial review of Selective Service orders like that in ques-
tion. ' 57 Only Mr. Justice Murphy dissented, contending that
in the absence of a statutory review procedure or a specific
statutory prohibition, "The power to administer complete
justice and to consider all reasonable pleas and defenses
must be presumed," lest "an individual should languish in
prison for five years without being accorded the opportunity
of proving that the prosecution was based upon arbitrary and
illegal administrative action. . .."58
Since concededly a person inducted into the armed forces
could, as had been the case under the Selective Draft Act of
1917, challenge the validity of his induction on limited
grounds in a habeas corpus proceeding, 59 the Falbo decision
56. Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549 at 554-555 (1944).
57. Id. at 555.
58. Id. at 557, 560-561.
59. See Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 123-124 (1946).
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seemed quite definitely to remit those who would question
their induction under the 1940 Act to the same remedy.60
Under this scheme, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter was later to
emphasize, the effectiveness of the draft procedure would
be complete. Subject only to review by habeas corpus, in
which "The issues . . . are quickly joined, strictly limited
and swiftly disposed of by a single judge," "the men having
submitted to induction would be in the army, available as
such, and not in prison for disobedience."61 In this way the
"united and continuous process designed to raise an army
speedily and efficiently," to which the Court had referred in
the Falbo opinion,62 would be completely operative, with pro-
tection to the individual against abuse resting upon careful
administrative procedure and the possibility of resort to
habeas corpus in unusual cases.
Such, however, was not to remain the picture for long.
Less than three months after the Falbo decision, the case of
Billings v. Truesdell63 disclosed that under the Selective Serv-
ice Act the inception of military control of drafted personnel
took place when the induction ceremony was performed-
not upon the appearance of the individual pursuant to the
order to present himself as had been the case under the
Draft Act of 1917. Hence Billings, who had refused to take
the oath of induction after having been accepted by the
Army, was ordered released upon habeas corpus from the
custody in which he was held to await trial by court martial
for his refusal. The offense he had committed, if any, said
the Court, was punishable in a civil court under the Selective
Service Act, not under the Articles of War.
Here, obviously, was a possible opportunity to challenge
the process of selection for military service at a stage when
the administrative proceedings had undoubtedly run their
course and all possibility of rejection had ended.6 4 In Estep
60. The authorities taking this view are cited in the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Estep case, 327 U. S.
114 at 140-141 (1946).
61. Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 141, 140 (1946) (concurr-
ing opinion).
62. 320 U. S. at 553.
63. 321 U. S. 542 (1944).
64. Changes in the Selective Service regulations which occurred very
soon after the Falbo decision provided for pre-induction physical
examinations in the registrant's locality and eliminated the
possibility of rejection at the time of reporting for induction.
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v. United States and Smith v. United States6 5 the opportunity
was seized. The defendants, petitioners in the Supreme
Court, were indicted for willfully refusing to submit to in-
duction after having reported and having been accepted for
military service. Both sought to defend upon the ground that
they were ministers of religion who had been wrongly denied
exemption as such; but the district courts, which were sus-
tained in their conclusions by the courts of appeals, held that
no such defense could be offered. The Supreme Court came
to the contrary conclusion, holding that the absence in fact
of statutory exempt status on the part of a Selective Service
registrant was jurisdictional to the authority of a board
to classify him as eligible for induction. Hence the adminis-
trative conclusion as to the fact was subject to judicial re-
view in a criminal proceeding. The opinion by Mr. Justice
Douglas, speaking for the majority composed of Justices
Black, Reed, Murphy, Rutledge, and himself, undertook, fur-
ther, to enumerate other possible circumstances in which a
local board would lack jurisdiction-circumstances which, if
alleged to exist, could be examined into by a criminal court
in a prosecution for refusal to submit to induction. These
included discrimination because of race, creed, color, or ac-
tivity or membership in a labor, political, religious, or other
organization; incumbency of a political office which the
statute and regulations made a basis for exemption; and dis-
regard of an explicit order from higher administrative au-
thority to reopen the classification of the registrant.66  Mr.
Justice Burton and Chief Justice Stone dissented. Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter concurred on other grounds but differed
vigorously with the reasoning of the majority opinion.
As regards the weight to be given the administrative
determination when a challenge to jurisdiction was offered
in a criminal prosecution, the Court in the Estep case noted
that "Congress .chose not to give administrative action under
this Act the customary scope of judicial review which ob-
tains under other statutes" and that "the question of juris-
Hence, as the Court later held in Dodez v. United States, 329
U. S. 338 (1946) with reference to reporting for work of national
importance, the registrant under these regulations exhausted
his administrative recourse without reporting and, if prosecuted
for refusing, might at that stage offer his defenses going to
the jurisdiction of the Selective Service Board.
65. Both reported at 327 U. S. 114 (1946).
66. Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114 at 121 (1946).
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diction... is reached only if there is no basis in fact for the
classification... [of] the registrant." The scope of judicial
inquiry would in essence be the same as in habeas corpus
proceedings after induction and in similar proceedings in
deportation cases.67  Whether the criminal court should re-
ceive evidence in addition to that in the administrative record
in considering a challenge to a Selective Service board's juris-
diction is not stated in the Estep opinion; but in Cox v.
United States"8 the Supreme Court held that it should not,
since there is no constitutional requirement of a judicial trial
of the issue raised. The opinion in that case by Mr. Justice
Reed points out that the registrant has full opportunity to
introduce evidence in the administrative proceeding; hence,
"it is quite in accord with justice to limit.., review" to the
evidence there presented.69 The review, moreover, is prop-
erly by the court and not by the jury, and is directed to the
question whether there is "any substantial basis ... in fact"
to support the board's classification. When that has been
determined, nothing relating to the classification remains
relevant to the issue of guilt.70 Justices Murphy and Rutledge
contended in dissent that the requirement of substan-
tial evidence in support of a board's jurisdictional determina-
tions should apply in such cases, as distinguished from the
67. Id. at 122-123. In a habeas corpus proceeding inquiry may be
made into the fairness of the administrative procedure, in addi-
tion to substantive "jurisdictional" factors. See Eagles v. Sam-
uels, 329 U. S. 304 (1946); Eagles v. Horowitz, 329 U. S. 317
(1946). If release is ordered on such a ground the administra-
tive process may be repeated; or the court may remand the
petitioner to await further proceedings instead of releasing him
entirely, "as law and justice may require" [REv. STAT. § 761
(1878), 28 U. S. C. § 461 (1946)]. See Tod v. Waldman, 266
U. S. 113 (1924). Such remission to custody, even if appro-
priate, would not be possible after an acquittal. In the Estep
and Smith cases themselves, which were criminal, challenges
were made to the local boards' procedure as well as to the validity
of the classifications. 327 U. S. at 117, 118. The Court's opin-
ion is not explicit as to whether the challenges to procedure
might be considered. If they could, an acquittal on this ground
alone might be required, provided a possibility existed that thejurisdictional determination might have been otherwise had the
procedural unfairness not occurred. A reopened classification
proceeding would, of course, then be in order.
68. 332 U. S. 442 (1947).
69. Id. at 454.
70. Id. at 452-453. Apparently the Justices were in agreement as
to the restriction of review to examination of the administrative
record by the court, since disagreement would have led to dis-
sent. Four Justices dissented on other grounds and Mr. Justice
Frankfurter concurred in the result of the case.
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lesser quantum of support which, in their view, the principal
opinion sanctioned. They also contended, with Justices Doug-
las and Black, that the board classifications in the three
cases decided together under the Cox case style could be
supported only if part-time ministers of the gospel were less
fully entitled to Selective Service exemption than full-time
ministers. Such a view ascribed "to Congress an intention
to discriminate among religious denominations and ministers
on the basis of wealth and necessity for secular work."'7 1
The philosophy of the five Justices who together deter-
mined the ultimate position of the Court in the Selective
Service cases, except for the difference that developed among
them in the Cox decision, had its roots in immigration and
deportation cases a quarter-of-a-century earlier, as will ap-
pear. As elaborated and applied in the Selective Service
decisions, however, the rationale had reference particularly
to the position of the individual who, when threatened with
criminal punishment, contends that the administrative action
giving rise to the threat is in some respect invalid. Mr. Jus-
tice Murphy, in the Falbo case, first expressed the view in
this series of decisions that in such circumstances, if the
administrative action should actually turn out to be invalid,
it would "not be in keeping with the high standards of our
judicial system" to permit punishment to be inflicted.72 Mr.
Justice Rutledge suggested at the same time, in a passage
already quoted' 3 that at least such challenges to administra-
tive action as are based on constitutional grounds must be
open to the individual charged with violation. Later in the
same term of Court he elaborated upon this thought, writing
in dissent for himself and Mr. Justice Murphy in an 0. P. A.
case. A provision of the Emergency Price Control Act which
required the federal courts to entertain prosecutions of al-
leged violators of price control orders, while withholding
from those courts the authority to inquire into the constitu-
tional validity of challenged orders, was, he contended, in-
valid. He adhered to this view notwithstanding the pro-
vision of the statute for challenges to such orders for limited
periods after their issuance, whereby administrative deter-
71. Id. at 459.
72. See Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549, 561 (1944) (dissent-
ing opinion).
73. Supra, p. 178.
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mination was followed by review in the Emergency Court
of Appeals. One reason for his contention was that the
contrary conclusion supplied a way to avoid "the guaranteed
protections of persons charged with crime in the trial of
their causes. ' 74 In this view, the "high standards of our
judicial system" become a constitutional requirement so far as
necessary to give opportunity to offer constitutional defenses
to a prosecution. In the Estep case Mr. Justice Murphy's
Falbo reasoning became that of the majority, which could
.. . not readily infer that Congress departed so far from
the traditional concepts of a fair trial when it made the
actions of the local boards 'final' as to provide that a citi-
zen of this country should go to jail for not obeying an un-
lawful order of an administrative agency. ' 75
IV
The same vivid consciousness of the human effects of
sustaining certain administrative determinations also ac-
counts, at least in part, for the broadened grounds for in-
validating deportation orders which emerged in the case of
Bridges v. Wixon .7 The same majority of the Court as in
the Vernilya-Brown, the Elgin, Joliet & Eastern, and the
Selective Service cases there released Harry Bridges from
custody to await deportation upon the ground that in mak-
ing a crucial determination leading to the deportation order
the Attorney General had misinterpreted a term in the stat-
ute and had acted invalidly upon evidence which was hear-
say and admitted at the hearing in violation of the regula-
tions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Con-
cededly the courts had been "liberal in relaxing the ordinary
rules of evidence in administrative hearings, ' 77 even to the
point of approving the admission of hearsay and sustaining
reliance upon it as a basis for conclusions. Moreover judi-
cial deference had in general been paid to the administrative
interpretation of statutory terms on the ground that Congress
had invoked the judgment of "those whose experience in a
particular field gave promise of a better-informed" result.78
74. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 483 (1944).
75. 327 U. S. 114 at 122 (1946).
76. 326 U. S. 135 (1945).
77. Id. at 154.
78. Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402, 412 (1941); National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111 (1944). See
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Here, however, prejudicial use of hearsay was not to be
tolerated ;79 and the Attorney General was not free to adopt
"too loose a meaning of the term" "affiliation," applied to
an organization of the subversive character attributed ad-
ministratively to the Communist Party, giving ground, when
found, for deportation.80 The reason as to both points was
that, "Though deportation is not technically a criminal pro-
ceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and de-
prives him of the right to stay and live and work in this
land of freedom"8' and hence "may result in the loss of
'all that makes life worth living.' ,,82 "Where the fate of a
human being is at stake,"'8 an administrative determination
adverse to him cannot be allowed to stand unless soundly
based. Recently the Court has again held invalid a deporta-
tion order based upon an interpretation of the statute that
would give it "a capricious application"-an interpretation,
this time, of the term "entry" in relation to a return to the
United States following an involuntary sojourn on foreign
soil.8
4
The explicit justification of more thorough judicial re-
view of certain administrative determinations in deportation
proceedings than is obtainable in other cases found its classic
expression in Ng Fung Ho v. White,85 from which the opinion
in the Bridges case quotes.8 6 There it was held that the fact
of alienage is jurisdictional to the administrative authority
to deport 87 and that the Fifth Amendment secures a judicial
trial of that fact upon habeas corpus, if citizenship is claimed
and a showing is made which demonstrates that the claim
is not frivolous. Mr. Justice Brandeis, who wrote the opin-
ion in the Ng Fung Ho case, argued for narrower judicial
Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges, and Jur-
ies: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 99-109, (1944),
for an illuminating discussion of the leading cases involving
such judicial deference.
79. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135 at 153-155 (1945).
80. Id. at 149.
81. Id. at 154.
82. Id. at 147.
83. Id. at 149.
84. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 68 Sup. Ct. 10 (1947).
85. 259 U. S. 276 (1922).
86. See supra, at note 82.
87. The Court recognized on the basis of earlier decisions that the
same rule does not apply in exclusion cases. Ng Fung Ho v.
White, 259 U. S. 276 at 282 (1922).
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review of other administrative determinations in his later
dissent in Crowell v. Benson.8 Under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, involved in that
case, and numerous other statutes a careful administrative
procedure and statutory judicial review are provided. Under
such statutes, Mr. Justice Brandeis contended, the review
should be confined to the administrative record, even when
such constitutional issues as alleged confiscation of property
are raised. 9 The Ng Fung Ho opinion itself did not recog-
nize this distinction, however, and consequently remains as
authority for expanded judicial review of any proceedings
that threaten an individual with loss of "all that makes life
worth living." In the Selective Service cases this reasoning
was applied, despite the existence of a safeguarded adminis-
trative procedure, to a threat arising from prosecution for
violation of an administrative order. In the deportation
cases the threat arises from direct enforcement of the order.
In the Selective Service cases the Ng Fung Ho case was in-
fluential;90 but in Cox v. United States,- the last of the
series, it was differentiated on the ground that whereas due
process requires a judicial hearing of the claim to citizen-
ship, there is no such requirement, but only a statutory right
to judicial review of the record, connected with determina-
tion of a claim to ministerial exemption from Selective Serv-
ice.
A more broadly-stated theory, measuring rights to judi-
cial review of administrative determinations where there is
no specific statutory provision for such review, appears in
the opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice Reed, in
Stark v. Wiczard, 2 with which only Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
who wrote an opinion, and Mr. Justice Black took issue.93
The question in that case was whether certain milk pro-
ducers, not members of a cooperative, who had sold milk in
an area covered by a milk-marketing order of the Secretary
of Agriculture, might seek to enjoin the deduction of certain
payments to cooperatives which the order directed should be
88. 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
89. Id. at 88-93, esp. at 90, n.26.
90. See the Estep opinion, 327 U. S. 114 at 120, 122 n.14 (1946).
91. 332 U. S. 442 at 454 (1947).
92. 321 U. S. 288 (1944).
93. Mr. Justice Jackson did not take part in the decision.
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made. The payments would come from a fund out of which
the plaintiffs would be paid for their milk and would re-
duce their compensation as well as that of cooperative mem-
bers; and the contention was that the payments were un-
authorized by the Act. The Act made provision for judicial
review of orders in proceedings brought by processors and
dealers, but none for challenges by producers. Doubtless the
reason was that producers were deemed beneficiaries of the
orders whose primary purpose was to establish minimum
prices for milk. Nevertheless the Court held that producers
may invoke the general equity powers of the federal courts
to determine whether an order contains "provisions entirely
outside of the Secretary's delegated powers. 9 4 They may do
so because such review is necessary to "protect justiciable
individual rights against administrative action fairly beyond
the granted powers." 95 Such rights reside in producers un-
der the Act because "The statute and the Order create a
right in the producer to avail himself of the protection of a
minimum price afforded by Governmental action," from
which he cannot be barred.9 6 Such a right rises "to the dig-
nity of an interest personal to him . . . " and where it is
alleged to be jeopardized by administrative action for which
authority is lacking, "the silence of Congress as to judicial
review is ... not to be construed as a denial of authority to
the aggrieved person to seek appropriate relief in the federal
courts .... .97 Here, moreover, analogously to the situation
in the Elgin, Joliet & Eastern case,9 8 the protection of "mi-
nority producers" was involved; for the action of majorities
voting in referenda, which were part of the statutory pro-
cess for formulating milk orders, might be influential in pro-
ducing "unlawful exactions."' 9
The Court's estimate of the importance of the producer
interests at stake seems sound, whether or not the extension
94. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, at 307 (1944). In United
States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, 307 U. S. 533 (1939), the
issues which a handler might raise in an enforcement proceed-
ing were held to be limited to those as to which the handler
could show an identifiable interest.
95. Id. at 310.
96. Id. at 303.
97. Id. at 304, 309.
98. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711 (1945),
aff'd upon rehearing, 327 U. S. 661 (1946).
99. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288 at 307 (1944).
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of judicial review for their protection was justified under
the statute. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's able dissent argued
strongly that Congress left the protection of producers, like
that of consumers,0 9 to the Secretary and to the safeguard-
ing procedures surrounding his actions; yet practically speak-
ing both interests may be at the mercy of dominant groups
whom judicial relief, when invoked, may occasionally serve
to check. Here as -in the cases previously reviewed the Court
majority has employed the process of statutory interpreta-
tion in the service of a philosophy of government which calls
for the availability of judicial protection, at least to a mini-
mum extent, to interests that may need it if freedom, eco-
nomic justice, and decency are to be preserved. In so doing
it has in a number of instances, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter
pointed out in his Estep concurrence, revived "all the casu-
istic difficulties spawned by the doctrine of 'jurisdictional
fact'" when it was harnessed to other causes.' 01 It is not
possible to ascertain from the Court's opinions or from theo-
retical considerations what determinations of fact or of law,
other than those specifically covered in the opinions, should
be deemed to affect the agencies' "authority" or "jurisdic-
tion" so as to open these determinations to judicial review
in the absence of specific statutory provision for such re-
100. Judicial review of administrative determinations at the instance
of consumers presents a vexed question. In Atlanta v. Ickes,
308 U. S. 517 (1939), the Court by per curiam action took the
position that a consumer of coal could not invoke the general
equity power of a federal court to enjoin the establishment of
minimum prices for coal under the Bituminous Coal Act. In
a later case the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, giving
the matter extensive consideration, distinguished the Atlanta
case and held that consumers might be "persons aggrieved"
under the same Act, entitled as such to bring a statutory pro-
ceeding to review a minimum-price order. Associated Industries
of New York v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (1943). In Parker v. Flem-
ing, 329 U. S. 531 (1947) the Court, although it recognized that
the Emergency Price Control Act precluded the challenge of
price and rent orders by consumers and tenants, held that ten-
ants were persons "subject to" an order which granted specific
permission to their landlord to commence eviction proceedings
in the state courts, and hence might under the statute maintain
protest proceedings before the Administrator, followed by judi-
cial review proceedings, directed against the order. In doing so
the Court overrode the administrative interpretation of the Act.
Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Frankfurter and Burton dis-
sented.
101. Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114 at 142 (1946) (concurring
opinion).
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view. Under the doctrine of Crowell v. Benson,102 which re-
quired a retrial in court of "jurisdictional facts," it was
similarly impossible to discover what facts were jurisdic-
tional and what not. As a result, the doctrine was largely
ignored or limited to the facts of Crowell v. Benson itself.10 3
Now, however, the doctrine is reestablished in relation to
other administrative agencies as a means of overcoming the
absence of statutory provision for review.
When this action of the Court majority is coupled with
its close scrutiny of administrative conclusions of law in cer-
tain other situations not here discussed, 10 4 despite their tech-
nical character or relationship to such executive provinces
as foreign affairs,105 it is evident that major qualifications
must be attached to the generalization that the present Su-
preme Court is more willing than the old to permit the dater-
102. 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
103. GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 1068-
1070, (2d ed. 1947), and authorities cited.
104. Parker v. Fleming, 329 U. S. 531 (1947); Thomas Paper Stock
Co. v. Porter, 328 U. S. 50 (1946); Ashbacker Radio Corp. v.
Federal Communications Comm., 326 U. S. 327 (1945); Addison
v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U. S. 607 (1944); Norton v. Warner Co.,
321 U. S. 565 (1944); cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321
(1944); United States v. Carolina Carriers Corp., 315 U. S. 475
(1942). In two instances the Interstate Commerce Commission
was informed that it had more power than it thought to give
effect to statutory policies. Schwabacher v. United States, 334
U. S. 182 (1948); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Railway
Labor Executives Ass'n., 315 U. S. 373 (1942). In Board of
Governors v. Agnew, 329 U. S. 441 (1947) the Court, while
sustaining an order of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System removing a bank director because of financial
connections which disqualified him, took pains to assert the
authority of the judiciary to review the question of law involved,
in a suit to enjoin the removal. Justices Rutledge and Frank-
furter disagreed as to this point. In other cases the authority
of administrative agencies with respect to matters entrusted
to their discretion has been strongly reaffirmed. Securities &
Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194 (1947);
New York v. United States, 331 U. S. 284 (1947); American
Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 329
U. S. 90 (1946); Federal Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas
Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944). See cases cited note 24 supra.
105. As in the Vermilya-Brown Co. case with which this discussion
began. In In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1 (1946) several aspects
of the legality of the proceedings of the military commission
which tried Japanese General Yamashita as an offender against
the laws of war were judicially examined in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings. See the opinion of the Court at 8-9 and the summary
in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy at 31. The
review of military acts affecting civilians is possible by similar
means. See the summary by Chief Justice Stone concurring, in
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304, 336 (1946). Cf. EX
parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283 (1944).
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minations of administrative authorities to stand.108 It is
clear that, among other reasons, the Court's deference ceases
at the point where it sees a need for protection to individuals
or to minority interests. When that point is reached, its in-
genuity in finding doctrinal bases for intervention by the
courts is fully equal to that of the predecessor bench in dis-
covering grounds for invalidating the rate orders of public
utility commissions. 1'07
V
The judicial statesmanship embodied in these tendencies
on the Court must be appraised with reference to, on the one
hand, its effects in particular areas of administration and,
on the other hand, its potentialities in the, future government
of the United States. Nothing that the Court has done nul-
lifies administrative effectiveness to a large extent, 108 as did
106. Cf. supra, notes 24, 78, 104.
107. It is not without interest that Mr. Justice Murphy, concurring
in the Estep case, cited some of the principal older cases which
subjected the rate orders of public utility commissions to broad
review, as authority for according "no less respect" to the pro-
tection of individuals than to safeguards "for the benefit of
corporations." 327 U. S. 114 at 127 (1946). Such decisions as
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287(1922), have, however, generally been regarded as abandoned.
C. Benjamin, Judicial Review of Administrative Adjudication:
ome Recent Decisions of the New York Court of Appeals, 48
COL. L. REv. 1, 19-25 (1948).
108. The Selective Service decisions following that in the Falbo case,
which might have done so, came after hostilities had ended and
the draft had run its course. In that opinion Mr. Justice Black
pointed out that, following administrative consideration of Fal-
bo's claim for exemption for more than a year, "Petitioner, 25
years of age, unmarried, and apparently in good health," was
"still litigating the question" 16 months after the final order to
report. The Court does not explain in the later cases how the
procedural obstructions to prompt induction that were recognized
as legitimate could be reconciled with the previous sense of
urgency to augment the armed forces and the personnel in con-
scientious-objector camps. Petitioner Cox used 31/2 years in liti-
gation. Cox v. United States, 332 U. S. 442, 444 (1947). The
Supreme Court phase of such litigation would, it is true, Have
been eliminated in many later instances by earlier cases' settle-
ment of the issues of law involved. To a large extent the ques-
tion of the probable effect of procedural delays turns on the
practical relation of prosecutions for disobedience to entry into
service. Mr. Justice Murphy proceeded upon the assumption
that the defendants were lost to the service in any event; the
question was simply whether they should be imprisoned. See
Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549 at 559 (1944) (dissenting
opinion); Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114 at 128-129 (1946)(concurring opinion). This view ignores the probability that
disobedience might not occur in many cases if review of adminis-
trative orders could not be had in criminal proceedings. The
19491
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the decisions of the former Court in public utility matters.
Where agency determinations have been overruled on points
of lawo 9 the issues have been relatively narrow and the ef-
fects have been limited to the particular kinds of situations
presented. On the whole, the enlarged freedom of the regu-
latory agencies from judicial surveillance over their discre-
tionary determinationsilo has cast the responsibility for sound
administrative policies upon the only authorities equipped to
discharge that responsibility, namely Congress and the regu-
latory bodies themselves. Where the Court has pried open
the door to judicial scrutiny of administrative determinations,
it has been modest in regard to the scope of the judicial in-
quiry, as in the Cox case. Its object has been to guard against
the possibility that lesser persons and groups may be with-
out means of protection against powerful interests or against
officials who may become oblivious or indifferent to legiti-
mate claims. Without erecting safeguards in all situations,"'
it has brought into being impressive judicial protections. Al-
though these have not been raised to the level of constitu-
tional requirements, they seem unlikely to be removed by
legislative action." 2
The work of the Court in the areas here examined is of
the same cloth as its treatment of constitutional safeguards
in criminal proceedings and its extension of First Amendment
and due process protection to civil liberties. In these consti-
tutional matters the prevailing Justices have expressed more
effectively the considerations that have moved them than in
the cases reviewed above.1 3 The opinion of Mr. Justice Reed
in Stark v. Wickard enunciates a general jurisprudential
theory which asserts that some interests "rise to the dignity"
of possessing a valid claim to judicial cognizance. However,
the opinion does not identify those interests except for the
opinion of the Court in Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542 at
549 n.2 (1944), points out, on the other hand, that conviction
for violation of the Selective Service Act might well be followed
by parole to the Director of Selective Service for induction.
109. See note 104 supra.
110. Ibid. See also notes 24, 78 supra.
111. Supra, note 23; infra, p. 191-2.
112. The Selective Service Act of 1948 contains the same provisions
for administrative finality as the Act of 1940. Pub. L. No. '759,
80th Cong., § 10(b) (3) (1948).
113. Their rationale has been subjected to keen analysis in Braden,
The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L. J.
571 (1948).
[Vol. 24
ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS
recognition, already noted, that the individual and minority
interests involved in the case were such as should be ac-
corded standing to sue. 11 4 The rationale here, coupled with
that underlying the other cases, parallels closely the philoso-
phy stated by Mr. Justice Stone in his famous Footnote 4 of
United States v. Carolene Products Co.," stressing protection
to democratic political processes and to minorities, when
threatened by legislation, as sufficiently important to bal-
ance the presumption that statutes are constitutional, as
against attack based on the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Bill of Rights. Democratic processes and minority rights
have their place in economic affairs as well as in political.
The danger that administrative action may strike them down
or deprive individuals of their freedom may need to be
averted by judicial intervention from time to time, just as
legislation or the zeal of law enforcement officers may re-
quire checking. Such, at any rate, is the conclusion of the
majority of the Court." 6
Since not all members of the Court are equally deter-
mined and thorough in seeking to give effect to policy con-
siderations that move them, and since history or clear legisla-
tive expression may control inclination, interests similar to
those usually accorded protection go without it upon occas-
ion. An instance of this sort occurred at the 1947 Term
1 7
when it was decided by a majority of five Justices that
habeas corpus could not be used to challenge the procedure
by which the Attorney General, as delegate of the Presi-
114. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288 at 307 (1944).
115. 304 U. S. 144, 152 (1938). In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516,
530 (1945), "the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by
the First Amendment" were recognized as coming within the
principle stated.
116. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's belief in adherence to an indicated
legislative intention that particular administrative determinations
shall not be reviewed is set forth with clarity and vigor in his
dissents in Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 311 (1944), and
Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, 749
(1945), and in his concurring opinion in Estep v. United States,
327 U. S. 114, 134 (1946). Necessarily this belief calls for
close studies of particular enactments, which in these instances
led to rejection of the suggestion that the congressional action
should receive limiting interpretation to avoid infringement
of "very sacred rights." Mr. Justice Frankfurter's philosophy
does not entirely reject the possibility of such interpretation
from time to time. Cf. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, 47 COL. L. Rsv. 517, 539 (1947).
117. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160 (1948).
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dent's power, determined that an enemy alien should be
deported pursuant to the Alien Enemy Act of 1798.118 The
majority's conclusion that the Act does not contemplate judi-
cial review is convincing;119 but it is true, as pointed out
in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, that judi-
cial review of deportation orders affecting non-enemy aliens
is built upon no firmer foundation of statutory text than
existed here. The majority,1 20 including Mr. Justice Reed
who with the dissenters had formed the majority in many
of the other cases here studied, was moved either by what
was deemed to be the clear meaning of the statute, or by a
sense that there is a significant difference between an ene-
my alien's claim to judicial protection and the claims of other
aliens.12 1
One may criticize the Court for not being more vigorous in
pursuit of essential objectives in a case such as that just dis-
cussed, as was the "old Court" in pursuit of its ends.122 Yet
a degree of modesty as to the judicial function, coupled with
a sense that logic limits legitimate judicial innovation, are
desirable too; for the Court should be a coordinator, develop-
er, and critic, rather than an innovator, of policy.123 The
significant question with regard to its work is whether it has
chosen soundly the issues and the occasions upon which to be
bold and whether the logical limits which it has observed
have aided in knitting together a body of law that has been
118. REv. STAT. 4067 as amended (1878), 50 U. S. C. § 21 (1946).
119. Not so the further conclusion of law that the power to deport
outlasted the period of hostilities because of the continuance
of a technical state of war for certain purposes.
120. Perhaps also Mr. Justice Black as to this point, since he dis-
sented on the point referred to in note 119, supra, relating to the
effect of the termination of hostilities, and did not join in Mr.
Justice Douglas's dissent on the point here dealt with.
121. The fact of enemy alienage was not disputed in the Ludecke
case. Had it been, judicial determination of that fact, no doubt
with "trial do novo," could have been had. In other deporta-
tion cases, however, the adequacy of the administrative pro-
cedure is also subject to judicial check, as it was not here.
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135 (1945).
122. Cf. Hamilton, Book Review, 56 YALu L. J. 1458 (1947).
123. The distinction is not a sharp one, of course,. In developing
the body of case law under the First Amendment and incorporat-
ing the prohibitions of that enactment into the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court has set the tone for opinion and legislative
action throughout the country-at least for the time being. In
doing so it has, however, drawn upon the fundamental thought
embodied in the Constitution, rather than manufactured a philos-
ophy out of whole cloth.
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at once coherent and vital. Reasons are not lacking for
valid objection on such grounds to some of the work of the
present Court.124 In the portion of that work here examined,
the potentiality for protecting individual and minority inter-
ests against group domination of administration and against
expanded governmental power, whch the Court has created,1-2 5
seems wholly good. In the Selective Service cases the effort
to overcome a false start in the Falbo case without repudiat-
ing it resulted in obfuscation. The reversal probably was
unnecessary as well; for habeas corpus afforded a recognized
remedy which need not have been inadequate in scope, and
there seemed to be little justification for erecting another
remedy beside it. The administrative process was also sur-
rounded with statutory safeguards. It must be conceded,
however, that uncooperative military authorities might ser-
iously obstruct access to counsel and courts by an inducted
individual, and that for this reason, if for no other, the op-
portunity to resist before induction and to test the justifica-
tion for resistance in court has something to be said for it.126
The decision in Bridges v. Wixon also seems legalistic and
124. Outstandingly, to United Mine Workers v. United States, 330
U. S. 258 (1947).
125. The Court has been criticized for twice denying certiorari in
Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 330 U. S. 838 (1947); 331 U. S. 865
(1947), involving the dismissal of a government employee be-
cause of doubt concerning his loyalty, Black and Douglas, JJ.,
disagreeing. The case, however, involved a transfer from a
non-civil service to a civil service position under the War Service
Regulations. The transfer had been authorized by the Civil
Service Commission conditionally upon the outcome of the in-
vestigation, which was required of it, into the transferee's "suit-
ability." Hence the "dismissal" was technically and in reality
a denial of appointment which, nevertheless, was accompanied
by a full explanation of the reasons for it. The Court would
have had to go far indeed to make the case a vehicle for the
assertion of constitutional or implied statutory power to review
administrative action affecting the tenure of government em-
ployees. At the same term it entertained a proceeding to inquire
into an alleged invasion of the constitutional rights of a federal
employee by the statute under which he was threatened with
dismissal. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75
(1947).
126. During the war the military authorities seem on the whole to
have been cooperative with personnel desiring to test the validity
of their induction. Less cooperative authorities might have
created difficulties not only in the original bringing of actions
but also by moving petitioners to points distant from those where
actions were brought. Whether such removals might be stayed
is by no means clear. As a practical matter, in any event, the
effectiveness of habeas corpus proceedings as against the armed
forces rests largely upon continued respect for judicial authority
on the part of military personnel, the Commander-in-Chief, and
his civilian aides.
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not particularly fruitful,'1 27 since essentially fair procedure
had been observed at the administrative level; yet one can
scarcely object to the rule that on evidence points the safe-
guards that operate in a criminal proceeding should prevail
in a deportation proceeding which may be personally dis-
astrous to the affected individual. In the railway labor and
other cases examined, in which protection has been extended
to interests seeking it, the decisions seem justified and are
adequately, even if disputably, grounded. The denial of judi-
cial review in the Mediation Board cases, on the other hand,
seems needlessly narrow. 128
At the conclusion of his dissent in Ludecke v. Watkins12 9
Mr. Justice Black suggests his belief that "because of today's
opinion individual liberty will be less secure tomorrow than
it was yesterday." If so, the reverse is nevertheless true as
a result of the body of cases and opinions here examined.
When personal interests or freedoms seem threatened as a
result of administrative action, the Court manifests readi-
ness to extend judicial safeguards to them, in the guise of
review of the fairness of the administrative procedure or
review of the administrative determination of jurisdictional
points, whether of fact or of law. 130 To this end it has used
the traditional legal method of harnessing technicalities to
the service of ends which are deemed important. Since tech-
nicalities may obscure issues. and limit conclusions as well
as serve essential purposes, however, and since the Justices'
schemes of value are not uniform, firm majorities in favor
of identified ends cannot be forecast with assurance. But
on the whole the Court, by its readiness to check abuse at the
hands of the powerful, serves the cause of that liberty which
it was and is the primary purpose of the separation of powers
to secure.
127. The writer was on the staff of the Solicitor General at the time
of the Bridges case and several of the Selective Service cases
herein discussed, but did not participate personally in any of
them.
128. See the opinion of Rutledge, J., dissenting, in Switchmen's Union
v. National Mediation Board, 135 F.2d 785 (App. D. C. 1943),
for a statement of the possible need of minority unions for pro-
tection in such cases.
129. 335 U. S. 160 at 183 (1948).
130. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, supra, note 18, may
increase somewhat the opportunities for judicial scrutiny of
administrative action. See United States ex Tel. Trinler v.
Carusi, 166 F.2d 457 (C. C. A. 3d 1948), and Comment, 34
IOWA L. REv. 91 (1948).
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